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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Taxation-Income-Long-Term Compensation-Partnerships
If an individual or a partnership receives' in a tax year at least
80 per cent of the total compensation 2 for personal services3 rendered
over a period of thirty-six months or more,4 § 107 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code may provide relief from the application of a high tax
bracket in that particular year.5 This relief is granted by limiting the
tax on such compensation to the additional tax that would have been
payable if the compensation had been received on a pro rata basis
over the period of service prior to the receipt of the qualifying pay-
ment.0 Thus the taxpayer is allowed the benefit of paying the smaller
1 If the taxpayer is on an accrual basis then an accrual is sufficient. INT. REV.
CODE § 107(a).2 Total compensation is important in determining whether the payment re-
ceived represents 80 per cent thereof. Thus what appears to be a qualifying pay-
ment in a particular year may be reduced below 80 per cent by a subsequent
payment for the same services. Also, there is a problem concerning the separa-
bility of lump-sum payments. For example, in one case the severance pay re-
ceived by an employee after 26 years of service was held to be not separable
from total compensation received over that period and so the 80 per cent test
was not met. Carrigan v. Commissioner, 197 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952). In
another case the additional pay to a corporate officer for services in connection
with a patent controversy between his employer-corporation and another corpora-
tion was held separable from his regular salary. E. A. Terrell, 14 T. C. 572
(1950).
' It has been held that advance payments from a client set apart in a trust
fund do not constitute compensation for personal services until withdrawn,
Hanna v. Commissioner, 156 F. 2d 135 (9th Cir. 1946). In another case it
was held that the proceeds arising from the compromise of a copyright infringe-
ment suit did not constitute compensation for personal services. Jack Rozen-
zweig et al., 1 T. C. 24 (1942).
'The period of thirty-six months or more is measured from the beginning of
services until their termination. The following cases are illustrative of the prob-
lems arising in this area: (a) Was there a thirty-six month period? Lucilla de
V. Whitman, 12 T. C. 324 (1949), aff'd, 178 F. 2d 913 (2d Cir. 1949) (corporate
salary of officer was for services rendered in current year, rather than compensa-
tion for the officer's services during the period in which the corporation was
formed); (b) When did the period begin? James D. Gordon, 10 T. C. 772
(1948), aff'd per curiam, 172 F. 2d 864 (2d Cir. 1949) (the period included
unsuccessful attempts to sell stock by a broker in addition to the time spent
by him on successful negotiations); Guy C. Myers, 11 T. C. 447 (1948) (time
spent in finding a customer may not be included); (c) When did the period
end? Norman R. Williams, 1951 P-H TC MEMO DEc. 1 51,207 (1951) (in the sale
of a corporation the broker's services continued until the last stockholder turned
in his stock).
IINT. REV. CODE § 107(a) provides: "If at least 80 per centum of the total
compensation for personal services covering a period of thirty-six calendar months
or more (from the beginning to the completion of such services) is received or
accrued in one taxable year by an individual or a partnership, the tax attributable
to any part thereof which is included in the gross income of any individual shall
not be greater than the aggregate of the taxes attributable to such Dart had it
been included in the gross income of such individual ratably over that part of
the neriod which precedes the date of such receipt or accrual."
' If the payment of 80 per cent or more is received upon the completion of
services, then the compensation will be spread over the period durinv which the
services were rendered. If the date of payment and the date of the completion
of services are different, then the earlier date is used as the ending date for
the allocation of the lump-sum comnensation for purposes of computing the tax.
Thus, in computing the tax, the allocation period may be less than thirty-six
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of either (1) the tax on the special compensation for the current year
without adjustment or (2) the additional tax on such compensati6n
which would have been payable if the pay had been spread evenly over
the period -during which services were rendered prior to the receipt
of the qualifying payment. The tax for other years is not changed, as
the statute merely provides a formula for computing the income tax
on long-term compensation in the year in which it is received.
This statutory- provision is of special interest to professional per-
sons and partnerships who frequently render services over a long period
of time and who may receive a large payment in one tax year.7 Proper
tax planning is desirable to insure that the requirements of § 107 (a) are
met.8 The problems to be considered here are some which are peculiar
to partnerships. These particular situations arise in connection with
the admission of new partners and the change of the business "entity"
while services are being rendered.
In Van Hook v. United States,9 the taxpayer, an attorney, was re-
quested in 1945 to join in the appeal of a case on which another at-
torney had been working for a period of about four years. The tax-
payer was to share in the contingent fee only in the event that the
outcome was favorable. In 1946 there was a favorable disposition of
the case and the taxpayer claimed the benefit of § 107 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code, even though the services which he performed
covered a period of only about thirteen months. The district court
determined that a joint venture existed and that this relationship quali-
fied as a partnership under § 107 (a).' Then the court held that the
taxpayer was entitled to spread the fee over the entire period during
which the services were rendered. In reversing, the circuit court,
assuming that there was a joint venture, held that the joint venture
did not exist prior to 1945 and, consequently, the taxpayer could not
months where the payment of 80 per cent or more of total compensation is re-
ceived prior to completion of services. U. S. TREAs. REG. 118, § 39.107-1 (1953).
' Thus this section is available to doctors, lawyers, accountants, executors,
architects, consultants, or anyone who may render personal services and meet
the other requirements.
INT. REv. CODE § 107(b) provides for similar treatment of income received
by individuals from artistic works or inventions.
INT. REV. CODE § 107(d) provides somewhat similar treatment for the back
pay received by an individual under specified circumstances.
For 107 (a) problems in general, see 29 A. L. R. 2d 592 (1953) ; Comments,
Current Problems Under 1. R. C. Section 107, 48 N. W. U. L. R. 51 (1953) ;
Bayly, Proper Use of Section 107 Lessens Tax Burden on Lump-Sum Income, 96
J. AcCOUNTANCy 582 (1953) ; Note, Section 107(a) and the Partnership, 65 HARv.
L. REv. 1193 (1952) ; Tannenbaum, Recent Developments Under Section 107, 9
IxsT. FED. TAX. 381 (N. Y. U. 1951).
0204 F. 2d 25 (7th Cir. 1953), reversing 107 F. Supp. 499 (N. D. Ill. 1952),
cert. denied 74 Sup. Ct. 42 (1953).
"INT. REv. CODE § 3797 (a) (2) provides, in part: "The term 'partnership'
includes a ... joint venture . . . by means of which any business, financial opera-
tions, or venture is carried on. .. ."
1954]
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tack on the services rendered by his partner in order to meet the thirty-
six month requirement. Furthermore, since there was no evidence
that the compensation received by the taxpayer covered any of the
services rendered prior to the formation of the joint venture, the fee
was considered to cover only current services.
Section 107 was brought into the law by the Revenue Act of 1939
and its provisions then covered compensation received for personal
services rendered "by an individual in his individual capacity, or as
a member of a partnership, and covering a period of five calendar years
or more from the beginning to the completion of such services .... 011
Under this statute it was held that a taxpayer could not tack on the
individual services of his new partner rendered prior to the formation
of the partnership.1 2  Under the prior law, the statutory language
seemed to make it plain that a partner must actually participate in the
services throughout the required time.
An amendment in 1942 changed § 107 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code to its present form. 13 One of the changes liberalized the require-
ments so that a partner who shares in long-term compensation may be
entitled to the benefits of the section, even though he performed none
of the services. 14
If a partner is a member of the partnership during the time in
which the services are rendered, he is entitled to the benefits of § 107 (a),
providing the other requirements are met, regardless of whether or not
he participates in the work.15 In Elder W. Marshall,1 where a new
"Revenue Act of 1939, § 220, 53 STAT. 878 (1939).
"Ralph G. Lindstrom, 3 T. C. 686 (1944), aff'd, 149 F. 2d 344 (9th Cir. 1945).
13 Revenue Act of 1942, § 139, 56 STAr. 837 (1942).
"The Congressional intent was stated in the following language: "In order
for section 107(a) to be applicable, it is not necessary that the individual who
includes in his gross income compensation for such personal services be the person
who rendered such services. For example, a partner who shares in compensation
for such personal services rendered by the partnership may be entitled to the
benefits of section 107(a), notwithstanding that he took no part in the rendering
of such services. Likewise, in community property states, the spouse of a person
who renders such personal services may be entitled to the benefits of section
107(a)." SEN. RzP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 109 (1942).
"
5 Although the partner does not perform any of the particular services he
is a part of the partnership for the required time and his share of partnership
income represents a return from all partnership services.
10 14 T. C. 90 (1950), aff'd per curiarn, 185 F. 2d 674 (3d Cir. 1950) ; accord,Burnham Enersen, 1950 P-H MEMO. DEc. f 50,024 (1950), aff'd per curriam,
187 F. 2d 233 (9th Cir. 1951; Sigvald Nielsen, 1950 P-H MEMO. DEC. 50,025(1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F. 2d 233 (9th Cir. 1951). In each of these cases
the new partner was an employee of the firm before being made a partner. InBurnham Enersen, .rpra, the partner, as an employee, participated in the services
from the beginning. However, this factor does not seem to be an important
element in the courts decision.
In Elder W. Marshall, supra, the court noted that the admission of a newpartner did not bring about a dissolution of the old firm or create a new one,
so that it could not be argued that the services were not rendered by the samepartnership. The opinion cited Callahan v. War Contracts Price Adjustment
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partner was admitted to the firm less than thirty-six months prior to
the receipt of the qualifying fees, the court held that he could avail
himself of the benefits of the statute and spread his share of the fees
back to the beginning of the services. The court held that it is "the
status of the recipient of the income in the year of receipt and not
either his status in prior years .. .or the identity of the individual
who contributed the services that is made to govern the application of
section 107. .... -17
However, in a later case law partners were not allowed to spread
back their share of long-term compensation where a different partner-
ship had rendered the services.' 8 The taxpayers were special partners
in a law firm which had performed services for an estate.' The firm
was dissolved due to the bankruptcy of one of the partners and a second
partnership was formed by the same parties. The taxpayers' status
remained the same as special partners with no interest in the assets.
The second partnership was dissolved because of the death of a partner.
A third firm was organized in which the taxpayers were general part-
ners owning a percentage interest in the assets, and this firm pur-
chased the claim against the estate from the first firm at public auction.
Upon the collection of the claim the taxpayers claimed that their share
represented payment for services rendered by them as members of the
first firm. The court held that the controlling factor was that the
partnership receiving the income was not the partnership which per-
formed the services and, therefore, § 107 (a) was not applicable. The
court stated that the amendment in 1942 "did not dispense with the
requirement that the partnership through which the taxpayer received
his income, must have performed the services for which the income is
paid."' 9
The decision in the Van Hook20 case appears to be sound. The
court's main consideration was the purpose for which § 107 was enacted
and that was to provide relief from the hardship resulting from the
receipt of long-term compensation in one year and subjecting it to tax
at higher surtax brackets. 21  The court noted that the 1942 amend-
Board, 13 T. C. 355 (1949) and the Uniform Partnership Act §§ 29, 31.
But see dissenting opinion, 14 T. C. at 95 (1950). Three judges in the Tax
Court (Hill, Leech and Arnold) dissented on the following grounds: (1) A new
partnership is formed when a new partner is admitted. The Uniform Partnership
Act does not change the common law rule that the old partnership is ended. (2)
The compensation received by the new partner was to cover only services since
admission.
xL 14 T. C. at 94, 95 (1950). § 107(a) has been applied to income earned by
a husband but attributable to his wife in a joint return filed under the income
splitting provisions. Hofferbert v. Marshall, 200 F. 2d 648 (4th Cir. 1952).
18 Sovik v. Shaughnessy, 191 F. 2d 895 (2d Cir. 1951).
191 F. 2d at 896 (2d Cir. 1951). 20 See note 9 supra.
21204 F. 2d at 27 (7th Cir. 1953). The court cited SEN. REP. No. 648, 76
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7.
14
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ment eliminated the requirement that the recipient of the compensation
be the one who performs the services, but the court emphasized that
"there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress
abandoned the 'burden' theory which was the motive for enacting the
original legislation. '22  In this case it is obvious that the compensa-
tion received by the taxpayer was for the services he had rendered and
those services covered only a thirteen month period.
It is submitted that this "burden" test represents a desirable approach
to the problem of the new partner in § 107 (a) situations. It seems
that the MarshalPl rationale is an unwarranted extension of the purpose
behind the statute, even though the situation came under the literal lan-
guage of the section, because the compensation received by the new
partner was for current services although it was measured, in part, by
long-term compensation. Perhaps the Marshall line of cases may be justi-
fied by the fact that in each of these cases the new partner was a former
employee. However, under the "burden" test this should not be sig-
nificant because the employee is paid for his services. Nevertheless, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue has announced that it would follow these
cases.24
The Van Hook decision appears to be a justifiable limitation on the
scope of § 107 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
PAUL M. CARRUTHERS
Torts-Malicious Prosecution-Public Officers
It would seem that all persons capable' of instituting, or causing
to be instituted, a malicious prosecution2 without probable cause should
" 204 F. 2d at 27 (7th Cir. 1953). 2" See note 16 supra.
" In G. C. M. 26993, 1951 INT. REv. BULL. No. 22 at 2, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue announced that it would follow the Marshall line of cases (see note
16 supra), and noted that in each of these cases there was a proper business
motive. It stated that a partner would be entitled to allocate his share of long-
term compensation over the entire period "notwithstanding the fact that part of
the services" were rendered prior to the admission of the partner.
One author has suggested the possibility that the Bureau may oppose alloca-
tion where all of the work was done prior to the admission of the new partner,
because of the wording of G. C. M. 26993, supra, quoted above. For this point
and for a discussion of several partnership questions that have not been considered
by the courts see note, 65 Hauv. L. Rrv. 1193, 1197 (1952).
'It is held in some instances that a mentally incompetent person, or an infant,
is not capable of instituting a malicious prosecution. 34 Am. JuR., Malicious Pros-
ecution § 84 (1941).
'In order to establish an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must
prove (1) that the defendant instituted or procured the institution of the criminal
prosecution against him; (2) that it was with malice; (3) that the prosecution
was without probable cause; and (4) that it was terminated in favor of the plain-
tiff in the action. Alexander v. Lindsey, 230 N. C. 663, 55 S. E. 2d 470 (1949).
No action will lie for the prosecution of a civil action with malice and without
probable cause, where there has been no arrest of the person or seizure of his
property. Jerome v. Shaw, 172 N. C. 862, 90 S. E. 764 (1916). Generally, see
34 Am. JuR., Malicious Prosecutio n §§ 1-171 (1941).
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